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This article examines the legal constraints that Canadian federalism places
on comprehensive environmental reforms. Having specific regard for
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act and its regulation of toxic
substances, the article questions the ability of federal constitutional
powers to support a broad scope for the statute. The article then
examines two approaches to this problem. First, it examines an
alternative vision of federalism which provides the federal government
with broad environmental authority. Secondly, it examines various
mechanisms of federal-provincial cooperation for their application to
comprehensive environmental schemes. It concludes that these options
provide enough scope to regulate environmental activities comprehensively
and imaginatively.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's environmental debates, reforming the behaviour
of individuals and corporations is the major concern; the topic of
constitutional reform is rarely addressed. Canadian environmentalists
have not appreciated how the Canadian constitution has limited
environmental reform. Yet Canadian federalism limits virtually all
major environmental reforms proposed by the federal government.
Environmentalists may compare the situation in Canada with that of
the United States. Modem American law projects the image of law
as an instrument of the people and it carries this image into
federalism. American federalism allows the states and the federal
government to respond to public pressure and to carry out
environmental reforms within their geographic boundaries. Canadian
federalism appears to lack this instrumentalism. Instead, federalism
appears as an opaque medium: if not blocked out altogether,
comprehensive reforms refract dramatically in the prism of
constitutional principles.
The Canadian public has expressed great interest in
environmental problems, but few appreciate the constitutional limits
on major environmental reforms. Although Canadian constitutional
lawyers have provided some general scholarship on the environment
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and the federal-provincial division of powers,1  their efforts have
been one-sided. In their examination of constitutional powers of
environmental importance, they have failed to relate these powers
to the enactment of major environmental reforms.
2
Environmentalists studying the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act suffered from this lack of awareness of Canadian
federalism. Although their comments provoked numerous changes
to the cEPA before its proclamation, environmentalists did not effect
some of the more important changes. Some important changes were
the result of constitutional pressures, particularly the pressures of
federalism. These pressures led the federal government to question
the scope of the CEPA in one of its most important reforms - the
regulation of toxic chemicals. From the initial draft legislation
providing comprehensive regulation over toxic chemicals,
constitutional pressures resulted in a legislative scheme which is
ambiguous and piecemeal. The government retreated from
regulating all toxic chemicals from cradle-to-grave; the current law
only applies to some chemicals and may not regulate any chemical
completely from cradle-to-grave.4  In this way, the division of
powers reduced an important environmental innovation down to
another piece of Canada's environmental law jigsaw puzzle. This
reduction leaves environmentalists with continued uncertainty about
environmental responsibility in Canada.
The constitutional pressures visible in the legislative process
of the cEPA apply to other major environmental reforms. In fact,
these pressures apply to any Canadian effort to provide
1 See D.P. Emond, 'qhe Case for a Greater Federal Role in the Environmental
Protection Field" (1972) 10 Osgoode Hall LJ. 647; D. Gibson, "Constitutional Jurisdiction
over Environmental Management in Canada" (1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 54; and D. Tingley, ed.,
Environmental Protection and the Canadian Constitution (Edmonton: Environmental Law
Centre, 1987).
2 A limited exception is A.R. Lucas's paper "Natural Resources and Environmental
Management: A Jurisdictional Primer" in Tingley, ibid at 31-43, but Lucas' analysis is very
general. More recently, Lucas provided a more detailed analysis of CEPA and the
constitutional division of powers in Case Comment on R v. Crown Zellerback Canada Ltd
(1989) 23 U.B.C. L Rev. 355.
3 R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 16 [hereinafter CEPA].
4 See infra, note 35.
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comprehensive environmental regulation of the sort provided by
American federal environmental laws dealing with toxins in the air,
water, and ground. The presence of these pressures suggest that
legislation resembling the American Clean Air Act,5 Water Quality
Act of 1987,6 and the Solid Waste Disposal Act7 is impossible in
Canada.
This paper begins with an examination of the CEPA to show
the type of environmental reform which runs into constitutional
difficulty. It examines how the cEPA has reformed the law of toxic
chemicals, showing the meaning and importance of comprehensive
environmental laws. Then the paper examines the federal
government's basic legislative powers for their potential to support
a major environmental reform like the cEPA. It focuses on the
legislative power over peace, order, and good government.8
Together, these sections introduce the problems of federalism
affecting comprehensive environmental reform in Canada.
The second part of the paper examines ways around the
murky medium of Canadian federalism. It turns to the common
element of the instrument/medium dichotomy: each is a mediator.
The second part emphasizes the role of constitutional law as
mediator. Just as instruments and media stand between things,
constitutional law stands between legal interests. The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms9 stands between individuals and the
state, for example. Federalism involves a more complex relationship
between Canadians and the state. It places two institutions between
individuals and the state: the federal and provincial governments.
This placement adds two institutional relationships to the individual-
state relationship. Federalism mediates relationships between the
federal government, the provincial governments, and the courts.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-642.
6 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87.
8 Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867]
s. 91 [hereinafter POGG].
9 Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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In this respect, federalism is about two dialogues:10 dialogue
with the provinces and dialogue with the courts. Dialogue captures
the idea that federalism provides no final answers. Each dialogue
presents a different approach to federalism problems in the
environment. Under the heading of dialogue with the courts, the
paper approaches Canadian federalism in terms of paradigms,1 1 not
just isolated cases or principles. It examines the plausibility of
adapting Canadian federalism to an American-style federalism.
Under the heading of dialogue with the provinces, the paper
approaches the problems of federalism in terms of administrative
cooperation between the federal and provincial governments. It
focuses on three schemes of federal-provincial cooperation which
have importance for comprehensive environmental regulation in
Canada.
This vision of federalism gives Canadian environmentalists
a spectrum of approaches to current federalism problems: at one
extreme, they can push for a change of current federalism limits and
allow the federal government to exercise broader responsibility over
the environment. This response is appropriate where environ-
mentalists feel that divided jurisdiction means divided responsibility
and unclear accountability. At the other extreme, environmentalists
can leave federalism alone and push for stronger ties of
administrative cooperation between the two levels of government.
Cooperative federalism can stand for more comprehensive
environmental measures than unilateral government action.
Environmentalists will also find in this paper a number of options
which fit between these two extremes. These options mix judicial
precedents and administrative arrangements in ways helpful to
implementing comprehensive environmental reforms in Canada.
10 The use of the term "dialogue" within theory comes from the philosophic tradition
which emphasizes the root of dialogue: logo. Thinking of dialogue and not simply logos
adds the perspective that lawmaking does not have an eternal essence; it is intersubjective
activity. For an affirmation of a "conversational" ideal for philosophy, see R. Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) at 389-
94, and P. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure-of Canadian Federalism" (1984),
34 U.T.L.J. 47 at 98-99.
11 For an explanation of this term, see T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
1 1989]
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II. FEDERALISM PROBLEMS FOR COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM
A. Comprehensive Reform: the CEPA Initiative on Toxic Chemicals
The CEPA1 2  now in force is Canada's widest ranging
environmental legislation yet in existence. It amends or replaces six
federal statutes13 to bring various aspects of air and water pollution
within its scope. Part II of the Act provides for the regulation of
toxic substances.1 4  It sets out the federal approach to cradle-to-
grave regulation.
1. Weaknesses of the Environmental Contaminants Ac9 5
Cradle-to-grave regulation is important from two standpoints.
In terms of legislative history, cradle-to-grave regulation overhauls
earlier federal legislation covering toxic chemicals. The scheme set
out in Part II of the CEPA replaces the universally criticized regime
provided by ECA.1 6  The ECA had three major shortcomings. First,
it lacked clear administrative priorities. Potentially, the ECA
12 Part II of the Act, Toxic Substances, incorporates cradle-to-grave regulation and its
description uses the expression life cycle regulation. The federal government has used the
cradle-to-grave expression to describe the aims of the Act: see Environment Canada,
Development of the EPA (Background Paper) (Ottawa: Ottawa Congress Centre, March 22,
23, and 24) at 5.
13 Part VII of the Act shows: (1) amendments to the Access to Information Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. A-1 and to the Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 5, and (2) the repeal
of the Clean AirAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-32; the Department of the Environment Act, R.S.C. 1985
(2d Supp.), c. 14; the Environmental Contaminants Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-10, except s. 4(6),
and the Ocean Dumping Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-2.
14 This term is not a term of art. Similar American law uses the classification of
hazardous substances: see the Solid Waste Disposal Act, supra, note 7.
15 Supra, note 13 [hereinafter ECA].
16 In its brief history, the Act was ineffective: its schedules included only seven
substances.
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encompassed all substances17 entering or "likely to enter the
environment in quantities that may constitute a danger to human
health or the environment. '18  However, the Act provided no
guidance on how to rank the substances. Moreover, the federal
government allocated few resources to EcA administrators. Thus,
the Act proved to be more symbolic than substantive. Secondly, the
Act excluded the public. It made no provision for public input into
the regulation of environmental contaminants, nor was there any
provision for public supervision of government activity. Thirdly, the
EcA failed to address toxic chemical disposal. Although federal air
and water pollution laws have covered some types or methods of
waste disposal, they have not covered the disposal of solid wastes,
which includes toxic wastes.
2. The reform provided by the cEPA: cradle-to-grave regulation
The CEPA deals with all three shortcomings of the EcA.
First, by using the term "toxic substances" rather than environmental
contaminants, the CEPA specifically provides administrative priorities:
administrators shall begin regulating the most toxic of substances.
19
The implicit policy is that the federal government will control waste
problems of acute toxicity, leaving the provinces responsible for
waste problems stemming from sheer volume.
20
Secondly, the CEPA also improves upon the ECA by
encouraging public participation: anyone may add a substance to
the priority substance list in the Act by making a request;21 anyone
17
See section 2(1) of the ECA, supra, note 13, which covered "any distinguishable kind
of inanimate matter (a) capable of becoming dispersed in the environment, or (b) capable
of becoming transformed in the environment into matter described in paragraph (a)."
18 Ibid, s. 3(1).
19 See the Priority Substances List, supra, note 3, s. 12.
20 Contrast this view with the American system where the federal government regulates
both aspects of waste disposal: see the Solid Waste Disposal Act, supra, note 7.
21 See supra, note 3, s. 12(4).
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may request a public review of a ministerial decision;22 and any two
adults who believe a person or corporation has violated the Act may
notify the Minister of the Environment.23 Under the latter "whistle
blower" provision, the minister must investigate the claim and report
back to the persons involved.
Thirdly, the cEPA provides a new theory of environmental
control. It remedies the omission in the Ec4 of disposal provisions
by adopting the theory of cradle-to-grave regulation. The cradle-
to-grave approach to toxic chemicals has been in place in the United
States since the 1970s.24 Cradle-to-grave regulation differs widely
from the approach taken by other environmental laws. Most
environmental regulation focuses on individual processes causing a
certain type of pollution. For example, air pollution regulation
focuses on individual contributions to air pollution within a certain
geographical jurisdiction.25 As well, most environmental regulation
focuses on production processes, providing point-source regulation
of pollution. Air and water pollution regulation controls point
sources like smoke stacks, exhaust pipes, and sewers.2 6 By contrast,
cradle-to-grave regulation tracks and limits the flow of toxic
chemicals everywhere the chemical exists. It goes beyond point-
source regulation to include regulation of the workplace, places of
storage, means of transportation, uses of the toxin, and finally,
disposal of the toxin.27  It stands for a new level of coordinated
environmental control.
22 Members of the public have sixty days to appeal any ministerial regulation or order
made under the toxic substance powers: ibid, ss 13, 48, and 89.
23 Ibid., ss 108-9.
24 Supra, note 7. However, California cradle-to-grave law preceded the federal law:
see Hazardous Waste Control Act, Cal. Health And Safety Code §§ 25100-240 (West, 1984).
25 In Canada, see the provincial environmental protection Acts; in the United States,
see the Clean AirAct, supra, note 5. For development and analysis of the latter Act, see R.B.
Stewart & J.E. Krier, Environmental Law and Policy, 2d ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978)
at 333-47.
26 For example, see the U.S. Clean Water Act, supra, note 6, § 1311, and the U.S. Clean
Air Act, supra, note 5, §§ 7411, 7412, and 7521. Also see N.A. Ashford, C. Ayers & R.F.
Stone, "Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation" (1985) 9 Harv. Envt'l L. Rev.
419 at 424 n. 11.
2 7 Supra, note 3, s. 34(1).
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The cEPA provides two levels of cradle-to-grave control.
The first level of control concerns information. The Act uses a
multi-media approach. In the first place, it increases the
Environment Minister's own network of information gathering,
providing for monitoring stations, environmental research, and the
sharing of information with the provinces.2 To regulate toxic
chemicals, the minister may gather information, conduct
investigations, 29 and request information held by individual parties
regarding any substance, its uses, and its composition.3 ° These
provisions cover chemicals now in use in Canada and any chemicals
hereafter used, stored, treated, or released in Canada.
But the CEPA is not simply oriented to government action.
It makes increased demands on industry for information related to
toxicity. There is a positive duty upon any importer, manufacturer,
processor, or distributor of a toxic substance to forward immediately
any information relevant to toxicity.31 Parties may declare infor-
mation confidential, 32 but this privilege is limited. The cEPA covers
a wide range of information that is outside confidentiality.
33
Going beyond information control, the cEPA provides cradle-
to-grave standard setting. As with earlier federal statutes, it
provides for the establishment of guidelines and codes of practice.
34
Yet the cEPA also provides binding regulatory standards. Though
the CEPA exempts some substances, 35 the minister has over twenty
28 bid., ss 7 and 8.
29 Ibid., s. 15(a).
30/bid., s. 16.
31 Ibid, s. 17.
32 Ibid, s. 19(1).
33 Ibid, ss 20(2)-(6).
34 Ibid, s. 8(1).
35 TheAct makes two types of exemption. First, it exempts substances regulated by other
federal departments, ibid, s. 34(3). Thus, pesticides remain under the supervision of the
Department of Agriculture; nuclear wastes remain under the supervision of the Department
of Energy, Mines, and Resources; the transportation of dangerous goods remain under the
Department of Transport; and deleterious substances remain under the supervision of the
Fisheries Department. Secondly, the Act appears to provide a small generators exemption.
1989]
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powers to cover toxic chemicals from cradle-to-grave. These powers
include regulating commercial and manufacturing processes and
regulating the location of a toxic chemical. The Act also specially
provides for federal action on emergencies or impending disasters
involving toxic chemicals.3 6  The cEPA combines these regulatory
powers with enforcement provisions covering investigations,
3 7
offences,38 and statutory remedies3 9
B. Law as Medium: Constitutional Limits on Federal Environmental
Powers
However worthy the objectives of the CEPA, it must satisfy
constitutional limits. The Canadian constitution tables over fifty
powers for division between the federal and provincial governments.
The federal government has over thirty of these powers. Several
federal powers have some relationship to the environment, but only
three powers have the scope to provide for comprehensive
Section 30(1)(b) requires the Minister to add a substance to the Domestic Substances List
[hereinafter DSL] where any individual's usage exceeds 1000 kilograms in any year,
accumulates to over 5000 kilograms over a period of time, or exceeds a prescribed quantity;
see also section 25(1)(a). However, theAct provides no minimum standard for substances on
the Toxic Substances List in section 12. Nor is there any requirement that a toxic substance
be on the DSL. Compare this approach with the Solid Waste Disposal Act, stpra, note 7,
which reduces the requirements for generators producing less than 1000 kilograms per month
and generally exempts producers of less than 100 kilograms per month: § 6921(d)(1).
However, this exemption is not absolute. Section 6921(d)(4) revokes this exemption where
protection of human health or the environment requires it.
36 Supra, note 3, ss 35 and 36.
37 TheAct gives the federal government the power to appoint its own investigative unit
or delegate the responsibility to provincial officials: ibid, s. 99(1)(b).
38 TheAct creates several offences: first, offences contravening minor provisions of the
Act; secondly, offences under section 115(1)(a), ibiaL, for damaging the environment and
under section 115(1)(b) for harming or risking harm to persons; and thirdly, an offence under
section 115 for intentionally or recklessly causing harm to the environment or to the health
of any person.
39 There are remedies attaching to personal liberty including imprisonment, ibid, ss 114,
115, and 116, injunctive relief, s. 135, and a wide variety of discretionary orders, ss 130 and
132. Additionally, there are monetary remedies including damages, ss 39 and 136, restitution,
s. 130(1)(1), and fines, ss 106 and 121.
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environmental regulation: criminal law,40 trade and commerce, 41 and
the general power of POGG.
1. Limits on the criminal law and trade and commerce powers
While each of these federal powers has received extensive
judicial analysis, they remain close to their conceptual roots as they
concern environmental regulation. Conceptual problems with the
criminal law and trade and commerce powers coincide with the
constitutional restrictions on these powers. There are conceptual
problems with the criminal law power as a vehicle for major
environmental reform because it is an extreme vehicle of change.
It is extreme because of the standards it sets and because of its
means of applying those standards. Concerning the types of
standards, the criminal law power encompasses harm to human
health; therefore, criminal sanctions are justified where actions
result in danger or injury to health. However, most environmental
problems are complex, mixing concerns for human health with
concern for environmental health and for continued economic
development. Even if a court accepts that criminal law includes
regulation and not just prohibition,42 it is unclear whether the
criminal law power supports regulation which does not simplify into
pure human health standards. Thus, it is unclear whether the
criminal law power extends to environmental harm43 and it is
40 Constitution Act 1867, supra, note 8, s. 91(27).
41 Ibid, s. 91(2).
42 See Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. A.G. Canada; (Reference Re Combines
Investigation Act and S. 498 Criminal Code), [1931] A.C. 310, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.)
[hereinafter Proprietary Articles Trade Assoc.] andR v. Wetmore, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 284. See also
Emond, supra, note 1 at 663-64.
43 For the view that the criminal law power extends to environmental harm only as it
affects human interests, see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crimes Against the
Environment by E.W. Keyserling (Ottawa: The Commission, 1985) at 67. For support of the
view that the criminal law power supports any interest in human health, see Standard Sausage
v. Lee, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 706 (B.C.C.A-) [hereinafter Standard Sausage]. In that case, the Court
permitted the criminal law power to ban food additives although the additives had not been
proven harmful. Note, however, that the indictable offences in section 115(1)(a) of the CEPA,
1989]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
unclear how far criminal law power extends into economic
concems.44 Criminal law is also extreme because of its process: it
relies on blunt force. One does not negotiate criminal standards
with guilty actors: one applies the full force of the law against
them. However, in complex environmental problems, negotiation is
essential.45 These problems with criminal law standards and with the
criminal law process indicate that the criminal law power is an
inappropriate vehicle for major environmental control.
There are conceptual problems with the trade and
commerce power as a vehicle of environmental reform because it
reduces the environment to an economic commodity. Many
attribute this characterization of the environment as the main cause
of current environmental problems.46 While a regulatory power
exists in order to control the regulated activity, environmental
regulation does not seem to resemble other trade and commerce
regulation: for example, it does not preserve trade and commerce
from predatory or deceitful interests.47  Environmental regulation
seems to limit trade and commerce for reasons unrelated to trade
supra, note 3, extend beyond human health to human interests in property and economic
protection. It protects uses of the environment.
44 The courts have sustained economic regulation like anti-combines law under the
criminal law power see Proprietary Articles Trade Assoc., supra, note 42,. But note that
Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. A.G. Quebec, (1950), [1951] AC. 179, [1950] 4 D.L.R.
689 (P.C.) [hereinafter Margarine Reference], denied that the criminal law power permits the
prohibition of commercial products solely for economic reasons.
45 For a discussion of negotiation process characterizing Canadian environmental law, see
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Political Economy of Environmental Hazards by T.F.
Schrecker (Ottawa: The Commission, 1984) at 7-9. The case of Reference Re The Board of
Commerce Ac 1919And Combines and Fair Prices Act 1919 (1921), [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.)
[hereinafter Re Board of Comerce] determined that the criminal law power could not support
case-by-case standard setting.
46 See J.A. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1981) at 16-17; but also see, infra, note 93.
47 Even these regulatory interests have been controversial in Canadian federalism.
Although upheld in General Motors of Canada Limited v. Cihy National Leasing (1989), 93 N.R.
326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter General Motors], combines legislation covering predatory interests
has been struck down several times under the trade and commerce power. Similarly,
legislation covering trade standards has been allowed for general standards, subject to strong
limitations: see Labatt Breweries of Can. Ltd v. A.G. Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914.
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and commerce. 4  While American courts have had no trouble
reading into their federal interstate commerce power the power to
regulate the environment, 49 Canadian courts have read Canada's
federal trade and commerce power restrictively5 0 This tradition
limits the application of the trade and commerce power to
environmental law.
2. The federal power to legislate under POGG.
The only general federal power without conceptual difficulty
for environmental reform is the general power of POGG. The
heading of peace has limited environmental connections, but there
is a strong basis for environmental control in the other two terms.
Comprehensive environmental reform is both a question of order
and of good government. Moreover, conceptually, there seems an
important place left open to POGG. If criminal law displays the
mediation of force, and commerce provides the mediation of
money,51 POGG may suggest the mediation of conversation. 2
48 The only exception to this may be environmental regulation of sustainable
development, but the federal government will face limits if it applies sustainability differently
to different industries.
49 See P. Soper, 'The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law" in E.L. Doglin
& T.G.P. Guilbert, eds, Federal Environmental Law (St. Paul: West Publishing, Environmental
Law Institution, 1974) at 20-125.
50 For a very recent discussion of this tradition, see N. Finkelstein, "Note on General
Motors of Canada Limited v. City National Leasing supra, note 47 and Quebec Ready Mix Inc.
v. Rocois Constiruction Inc. [(1989) 93 N.R. 388 (S.C.C.)]" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 802.
51 The conceptual distinctions between these powers were provoked by a discussion of
law in J. Habermas, Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1987) at 178 and 365.
52 Good government implies government will be responsive to the needs of those it
governs, not just state needs: good government, not good statesmanship. Were this term the
subject of judicial scrutiny for legislative initiatives relying on POGG, one might expect the
legislation to follow upon extensive public consultation and to provide for citizen involvement
in the implementation, administration, and enforcement of the scheme.
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a) The test set out in R. v. Crown Zellerbach"3
Constitutional jurisprudence uses all three terms within the
expression, peace, order, and good government. In Crown
Zellerbach, one finds POGG divided into two powers: (1) an
emergency power; and (2) a power to deal with any matter causing
"national concern." The emergency power derives from the terms
peace and order. The national concern power derives from the
terms order and good government: it includes all matters not
otherwise covered by the constitution, and matters needing order in
the form of national uniformity. Currently, the procedural element
of good government is not widely discussed, but there are some
Canadian precedents of responsive government within POGG.5 4
Although the emergency power has limited application to
environmental legislation, it merits some attention since the cEPA
establishes emergency powers for the cleanup of toxic chemicals.
55
In Reference Re The Anti-Inflation Act,5 6 the scope of this power is
articulated. There, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the emergency power could justify only temporary measures to
control inflation. More recently in Crown Zellerbach, the court re-
affirmed limiting this emergency power to temporary measures.
5 7
Since the general scheme provided by the cEPA is permanent - a
must for businesses to amend their conduct - the emergency power
cannot provide comprehensive environmental control.
The general power of POGG, articulated under the national
dimensions test, is the most likely source of federal environmental
control. The Crown Zellerbach decision traced the development of
53 (1988), 3 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 1 (S.C.C) [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach].
54 In particular, the prohibition cases provided referendum mechanisms enabling each
community to decide its implementation of federal legislation: see A.G. Ontario v. A.G.
Canada, [1896] AC. 348 (P.C.) [hereinafter Local Prohibition], and A.G. Ontario v. Canada
Ternperance Fed, [1946] A.C. 193, 2 D.LR. 1 (P.C.) [hereinafter Canada Temperance
Federation].
55 Supra, note 3, ss 35 and 36.
56 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.LR. (3d) 452 [hereinafter Anti-Inflation Reference cited to
D.LR.].
5 7 Supra, note 53 at 32.
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the national dimensions power back forty years. The court
concluded that the power includes two types of subject matter.
58
First, it includes classes of subject matter not included in the 1867
list of the division. Secondly, it includes classes of subject matter
which were originally allocated to the provinces but which are now
matters of national concern.
This second branch of POGG has enormous potential for
federal environmental reforms. It allows the federal government to
legislate in matters clearly within provincial jurisdiction. In
particular, this branch of POGG may allow for the federal regulation
of economic incentives,5 9 pollution compensation schemes, 60 and an
environmental bill of rights.61 These federal efforts would stem
from a failure by the provinces to enact similar effective reforms.
62
58 Ibid.
59 J.W. Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1968) at 81 provides a good start to economic incentives with the three legal instruments that
government may choose: regulation, subsidies, and charges to control economic behaviour
adversely affecting the environment. Federal environmental control follows the regulation
model almost exclusively. The only exception is the subsidy used in programmes such as
DRECT, the Class 34 Energy Conservation Equipment Tax Incentive Program for energy
conservation, the Environmental Partners Fund for community clean up, and the St. Lawrence
River Environmental Technology Development Program: see the Guide to Federal Programs
and Services (10th) (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990). Subsidies, however, do not have the
public support needed to effectively control pollution.
60 In the United States, for example, the federal government has provided a scheme to
clean up unsafe disposal sites: see the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Clean-up, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 [hereinafter CERCLA]. This Act creates a fund to clean
up disposal sites across the U.S. In Canada, the provinces may pass compensation schemes
for the environment: see Interprovincial Cooperatives v. R., [1976] S.C.R. 477, 53 D.L.R. (3d)
321 [hereinafter International Cooperatives cited to D.L.R.]. However, the federal government
is restricted: see A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontatio, [1937] A.C. 355 (P.C.) [hereinafter
Employment and Social Insurance Reference].
61 The federal government appears restricted from enacting a general environmental bill
of rights covering all government action because the provinces have jurisdiction over civil
rights under section 92(13) of the constitution, supra, note 8. This restriction was commented
upon most recently in the case of MacDonald v. Vapour Canada (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134,
66 D.L.R. (3d) 1. In that case, Laskin CJ. struck down federal legislation because it created
civil causes of action independent of a federal regulatory scheme. However, the passage of
the federal Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 suggests that the federal government can provide
a bill of rights applicable within its own domains.
62 Ontario is an exception: it has provided a compensation scheme for pollution in its
Environment Enforcement Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1986, c. 68. However, even the
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The extension of the CEPA into these areas would strengthen its aim
of comprehensive environmental regulation.
The court in Crown Zellerbach clarifies, however, that any
matter fitting under this second branch of POGG must satisfy certain
requirements.63  First, the matter must have a singleness,
distinctness, and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from
provincial matters. It cannot group clearly provincial matters,
masquerading them as new national concern. Secondly, the matter
cannot overly prejudice provincial interests. The court requires that
federal involvement is necessary for the interests of Canada as a
whole, and that such involvement use measures the least intrusive to
provincial interests.
In considering this second matter, the court may have regard
to the extraprovincial effect of a province not regulating this area.
Where a province's failure to enact regulations has prejudiced the
interests of other provinces, accommodating federal regulation has
additional legitimacy.
In Crown Zellerbach, the court applied this national concern
test to the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act.64  The Act
prohibited dumping into the ocean, including provincial waters,
unless a license was obtained. Because the Act clearly applied to
provincial waters, the federal government had to argue that ocean
dumping in provincial waters could no longer be left in provincial
hands. The court accepted this argument by finding that ocean
dumping was a unified and distinct aspect of water pollution - it
was distinguished from fresh water pollution, for example. The
court used this finding to decide also that the scope of the
legislation sufficiently accommodated provincial autonomy. Lastly,
the court found that not granting the federal government this
jurisdiction would cause uncertainty and regulatory chaos in ocean
dumping.
The court's conclusions, however, were not unanimous.
Justice La Forest provided a strong, conceptually grounded dissent
Ontario government has failed to enact an environmental bill of rights or involve economic
incentives in regulation.
63 Supra, note 53 at 32.
64 This Act, now repealed, is incorporated into Part VI of the CEPA, supra, note 3.
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which received the support of Justices Beetz and Lamer. For La
Forest J., the basic issue was whether any federal constitutional
power could support regulation of an activity on provincially owned
land within a province, with only local works and undertakings
involved, when that activity had no impact beyond the limits of that
province.
65
In his view, POGG provided the only answer. Turning to
POGG, La Forest J. agreed with Justice Le Dain's characterization of
its scope. Applying POGG to environmental matters, La Forest J.
allowed that it could extend to the regulation and prohibition of
intraprovincial dumping if that dumping had potential impact on
federal waters. He also allowed that POGG could regulate the
sources of ocean pollution, extending to provincial water and to air
emissions which landed in the ocean. Furthermore, regulation could
include emission standards and standards to control the substances
used in manufacture or the techniques of production.
66
La Forest J. did not, however, agree that POGG could
support the Ocean Dumping Control Act. He disagreed with the
majority on every aspect of the application of POOG. First, La
Forest J. denied that POGG could extend to blanket coverage of
intraprovincial activity without a clear indication of federal concern
with non-hazardous substances. He demanded evidence that the full
range of control was necessary to prevent the regulated harm.
67
Secondly, La Forest J. denied that ocean dumping is sufficiently
discrete and distinctive. He found that marine waters are not
bounded by the Canadian coast, that the line between salt and fresh
water is unclear, that the intermixture of ocean and fresh waters
necessitates that pollution control extend to both, and that ocean
pollution is not confined to water emissions, but- includes air
emissions. He summarized this part of his argument by saying that
the current Act tried to control pollution on unclear geographic
grounds. Thirdly, La Forest J. found this legislation had great
impact on provincial interests. Not only could the Act control
65 Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 53 at 42.
66 biMd at 44.
6 7 Aid at 46.
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activities on provincially owned land, it could control municipal and
industrial water emissions from all urban centres - a field
traditionally regulated by municipal governments. Lastly, La Forest
J. assessed the impact that the failure of the federal legislation
would have had on the country as a whole. He found this impact
unclear since there was no evidence that the dumping of non-
deleterious substances raised problems beyond any provincial
boundary. Thus the attempt to regulate the activities of local
industries on provincial lands was impermissible without evidence of
a clear connection to a federal purpose.
By way of remedy, because he found the definition of
federal waters in the Act excessively broad, Justice La Forest refused
to read down the federal legislation to include only federal waters.
b) Applying the Crown Zellerbach test to the cradle-to-grave control
in the cEPA
The general importance of Crown Zellerbach for
environmental control is in its application to other environmental
regulation. Can the regulation of toxic chemicals in the cEPA satisfy
the Crown Zellerbach principles? The Declaration and the Preamble
to the CEPA suggest that the federal government is relying on PoG0
for this regulation.68 Unfortunately, the cEPA does not fit into the
Crown Zellerbach test as clearly as the ocean dumping scenario.
Turning to the singleness and distinctness of the scheme, the federal
government has in its favour the unifying concept of cradle-to-grave
regulation. Such a concept, however, resembles inflation which
failed the national dimensions test in Anti-Inflation Reference. A
court may find that, like inflation, cradle-to-grave control is simply
a new grouping of traditionally discrete subjects.69 Moreover, the
fact that many of these matters are federal - as is the regulation of
68 The Declaration, supra, note 3, states that the "[p]rotection of the environment is
essential to the well-being of Canada." The Preamble which follows identifies toxic substances
as a "matter of national concern."
69 Note especially the dissent of La Forest J. in Crown Zelerbach, supra, note 53 at 48-
51, where he relates the inflation heading to environmental protection.
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extraprovincial pollution from toxic chemicals7 - may be outweighed
by the inclusion of matters having a provincial tie. These matters
include regulation of the workplace, local trades and businesses,
71
and waste disposal sites.
Another strike against the cEPA is its definition of toxic
chemicals. 72 The definition is very broad, providing no limitation
on the number of chemicals it may regulate.73 Thus, if a court
accepted this definition and granted the federal government basic
jurisdiction over toxic chemicals, the cEPA would seem to
substantially violate provincial autonomy.
The most substantial invasion of provincial autonomy is the
standard-setting powers the CEPA provides for cradle-to-grave
regulation. These powers apply to over twenty domains, including
the following domains of provincial authority:
(1) the "commercial, manufacturing and processing activities in
the course of which the substance may be released;"
(2) the quantity of the substance that may be produced;
(3) the manner in which the substance may be transported; and
(4) the "manner, conditions, places and methods of disposal of
the substance or a product containing the substance
70 Support for this power comes from the decision of Interprovincial Cooperatives, supra,
note 60. The decision provided a territorial limit on provincial pollution legislation. It was
suggested that the problem unsuccessfully addressed by the provinces might be addressed
under the residual power of POGG.
71 The application of POGG to particular industries on a case-by-case basis was first
denied in Re Board of Commerce, supra, note 45, a case regarding the federal regulation of
profits.
72 Section 11, supra, note 3, specifies that a substance is toxic if it enters or may enter
the environment in a quantity or concentration or under conditions. (a) having or that may
have an hmediate or long-term harmfld effect on the environment; (b) constituting or that
may constitute a danger to the environment on which human life depends; or (c) constituting
or that may constitute a danger in Canada to human life or health (emphasis added).
73 At present, the Act does not cover substances regulated cradle-to-grave by other
federal statutes, but as these other federal statutes do not have cradle-to-grave scope, the
CEPA may regulate some aspects of chemical use not covered elsewhere under its residual
environmental power supra, note 3, s. 54.
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including standards for the construction, maintenance, and
inspection of disposal sites."
74
The CEPA tries to limit its substantial impact on provincial
authority in three ways. First, it provides a small generators
exemption.75 Secondly, the regulations of the CEPA may not apply
to substances and activities in provinces where the federal cabinet
has written evidence of federal-provincial agreement that some
standards are "equivalent" and where the enforcement provisions are
"similar."76 Lastly, the cEPA creates a federal-provincial advisory
committee to avoid "conflict between, and duplication in, federal and
provincial regulatory activity."77 Recent amendments 78 to the CEPA
require the federal government to receive advice from the advisory
committee before making any regulations under section 34.
Yet these limits do not affect the basic scope of the CEPA.
Were cradle-to-grave regulation in the CEPA to exist for hundreds of
chemicals, provincial jurisdiction would be eliminated in many
spheres of local environmental interest. However, the provincial
equivalency test in the CEPA has one significant constitutional result:
each toxic substance receives different regulatory treatment. This
brings into play the severability doctrine.79 This doctrine allows a
court to discard unconstitutional provisions or regulation without
striking down the scheme as a whole. Since much depends on the
respective provincial laws concerning the substance, constitutional
challenges for any one regulation on a substance appear severable
from the constitutionality of other regulations on the same substance
and from the constitutionality of the scheme as a whole.
74 Ibid, s. 34(1).
75 See supra, note 35.
76 Supra, note 3, s. 34(6);
77 Ibid, s. 6(1).
78 S.C. 1989, c. 9.
79 See Reference Re Agricultural Products MarketingAct, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, 84 D.L.R.
(3d) 257 [hereinafter Egg Marketing Reference] and P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada
2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 325-27.
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The federal scheme is helped also by the fourth component
in the Crown Zellerbach test, the "provincial inability"
consideration.80 It addresses the prejudice that would result from
individual provinces not regulating toxic chemicals cradle-to-grave.
The federal government may assert two reasons why cradle-to-grave
regulation requires indivisible application across the country. First,
the federal legislation eliminates pollution havens. Were cradle-to-
grave legislation left to the provinces, a province might enact
legislation to attract businesses disenchanted with regulatory costs.
Only federal legislation avoids this problem. Secondly, federal
regulation may create an equitable distribution of toxic waste
disposal sites across Canada. Toxic chemicals present enormous
disposal problems.81 Because of the persistence of such chemicals,
and because of the severity of effects resulting from slight leakage,
no province benefits from locating a dump site within its boundaries.
Rather, a province providing such sites would benefit other
provinces since they would use those sites to dispose of their waste.
This prospect means that provinces refrain from providing their own
dumpsites. As a consequence, Canada suffers from a shortage of
proper disposal facilities and implicitly encourages illegal or unsafe
disposal practices. The provinces cannot control this problem: a
provincial law prohibiting a province from receiving wastes from
another province would conflict with the spirit of the constitution on
free trade between the provinces.
82
These two considerations in favour of a national scheme of
regulation are not enough to justify federal cradle-to-grave
regulation. The majority decision of Crown Zellerbach makes the
provincial inability problem an ancillary consideration only: it arises
8 0 Supra, note 53 at 32-34.
81 American legal scholars describe this problem as the "reverse commons" problem: see
K.L. Florini, "Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?"
(1982) 6 Harv. Envt'l L. Rev. 307 at 324-26.
82 Section 121 of the Constitution Ac4 1867, supra, note 8, requires free trade between
the provinces for all articles of growth, produce, and manufacture. Only where a court took
a strict view of section 121 would waste be deemed outside the section, although it might be
ultra vires a province since it deals with interprovincial trade and commerce which is exclusive
federal jurisdiction. For U.S. litigation on same topic, see Florini, ibid at 327-31. However,
as Florini notes at 331-34, state ownership (in contrast to state regulation) of disposal sites
may overcome the problem.
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only where a court finds a singleness about the regulation and a
lack of serious risks to federalism. Because of the extensive scope
of the regulation into several areas of provincial control, and
because of the vagueness of the definition of a toxic substance, this
singleness and distinctness does not appear to exist.
II. LEGAL DIALOGUE ABOUT FEDERALISM
A. Reassessing Judicial Dialogue: the Paradigms of Canadian
Federalism
The preceding analysis of Canadian federalism suggests
grave difficulties for the federal government in providing major
environmental reforms: there are basic problems with providing
major environmental reforms by the use of the basic federal powers
over POGG, criminal law, and trade and commerce. Problems with
these basic powers are complemented by a peculiar notion of
federalism in general. Canadian federalism is not just geographic, it
is jurisdictional.
1. Contrasting Canadian and American federalism: jurisdictional v.
geographical federalism
Canadian federalism presents the image of law as a medium.
To understand this image, think of a telescope. We stand on side
with an intention to focus on something. We train the telescope on
that thing and, if all works perfectly, we achieve that focus. The
telescope is a medium because it affects our image of the world. If
the telescope does not function properly, we do not see the thing
clearly. Or, more appropriately, if the telescope has murky lenses,
the thing we focus upon is murky. The Canadian picture of federal
law appears to be a murky medium because, like a malfunctioning
telescope, the application of Canadian federalism onto federal
environmental initiatives leaves the constitutionality of those
initiatives extremely murky.
Taking only the general powers of trade and commerce,
criminal law, and POGG, Canadian federalism appreciates federal
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reforms in peculiar ways. Initiatives that involve trade and
commerce initiatives have been coloured into the shades of criminal
law;83 criminal law initiatives have been coloured into POGG;84 and
POGG initiatives have been blacked out simply according to the
times.85 In this murky medium, reforms do not merely risk murky
definition, they risk being indefinitely obscured.8 6
Federalism need not be a murky medium. In particular, the
Canadian image of federalism has little in common with the
American version. American federalism hinges on the federal
authority over interstate commerce.8 7 Over the years, American
courts have read this authority broadly, providing federal control of
any activities impacting on such commerce 88 This reading has
provided the American federal government with virtually unlimited
regulatory abilities8 9 On the other side, the states have authority
over all residual matters.90 This authority allows states to regulate
most concerns not addressed by the federal government. The image
of law present to American reformers in dealing with their system
of federalism is as an instrument.91 American federalism is a tool
83 See, for example, Proprietay Articles Trade Assoc., supra, note 42.
84 See R. v. Hauser, [19791 1 S.C.R. 984, 98 D.LR. (3d) 193.
85 See the prohibition cases from Russell v. R (1882), [1881-82] 7 A.C. 829 (P.C.) to
Canada Temperance Federation, supra, note 54.
86 Combines legislation was severely restricted for over sixty years because it was not
supportable under the trade and commerce power.
87 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
88 See the cases of Ogden v. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971) which held that American federal
government had exclusive control over (1) the prevention of the misuse of the channels of
commerce, (2) the protection of the instrumentalities of commerce, and (3) the regulation
of activities affecting interstate commerce. These activities affecting interstate commerce
include impacts on production, consumption, or marketing, including any indirect impact.
89 See Soper, supra, note 49 at 25.
90 U.S. Const. amend X See J.R. Alexander, "State Sovereignty in the Federal System:
Constitutional Protection Under the 10th and 11th Amendments" (1986) 16 Publius 1.
91 For a discussion of this image in relation to American law, see M.J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law 1760-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977),
particularly at 16-30.
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clarifying and assisting implementation, not one inhibiting it.
Therefore, in the field of environmental regulation, American
federalism adheres to an idea of joint autonomy: each level of
government is capable of passing comprehensive legislation. The
restrictions are geographical. The federal government cannot invade
purely intra-state activities, while states cannot regulate interstate
activities.
92
Joint sovereignty gives American federalism the image of
law as an instrument of each level of government. So long as
governments respect geographic boundaries, each level may enter a
regulatory field. As a result, federal-state controversies emphasize
policy not law: they deal with the question of who is best suited to
provide a certain regulation.93
In terms of the American example, Canadian federalism is
both geographical and jurisdictional. In addition to geographic
limits, each level of government relies on different powers of
legislation. Areas within provincial powers do not have federal
counterparts and vice-versa. The foundation of this jurisdictional
federalism is the provincial power over property and civil rights.
Any area involving property and civil rights cannot be regulated by
the federal government.9 4 The broad interpretation of the property
and civil rights power has resulted in a black hole into which no
federal reform may pass.95 Therefore, the jurisdictional basis of
92 In the United States, the only real controversies surrounding federal jurisdiction
involve matters where the federal government has tried to pressure state governments to
administer federal Acts: see J. Kessler, "The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Threat
to Federalism?" (1976) 76 Columbia L. Rev. 990, and Stewart & Krier, supra, note 25 at 1009.
93 The instrumental status of law need not be tied to an instrumental relation to nature.
Some legal commentators argue that instrumentalism of the American type may promote
conservation tactics: see Soper, supra, note 49 at 34.
94 Section 94 of the Constitution Ac; 1867, supra, note 8, seems to conflict with this
proposition: it only clearly restricts the federal government from regulating property and civil
rights for the province of Quebec. However, section 94 provides two additional limits on
federal regulation: first, it applies only where the common law provinces consent to its
application; secondly, it only applies to the original three common law provinces. These
restrictions explain why the power has not been considered significant.
95 The "mutual modification" interpretation of the Canadian constitution compels a court
to exclude from federal control any matter within a provincial domain like property and civil
rights: see W.R. Lederman, "Classification of Laws and the British North American Act" in
W.R. Lederman, ed., The Courts and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClelland and
[voi- 29 NO. I
1989] Environmental Reform 151
Canadian federalism is not simply textual, but it is strongly supported
by Canadian constitutional jurisprudence.
96
The jurisdictional reading of Canadian federalism also limits
provincial environmental reforms. These limits include geographic
limits: while provinces have wide powers over local problems, they
must avoid laws which extend into interprovincial or international
areas of transportation, commerce, or resource flow.97  While this
limit affects their ability to regulate the environmental impacts of
moving targets - vehicles, commercial goods, and resources - the
provinces may regulate these concerns where they regulate
intraprovincial and interprovincial subjects equally.98 Yet provinces
also face jurisdictional restrictions. First, they must respect fiscal
limits on environmental control. Their inability to issue indirect
taxes99 limits their ability to create charging schemes; and their
inability to issue licences for any purpose 0 0 limits their ability to
licence environmental purposes. Secondly, provinces are limited in
the types of offences and penalties they may create, since only the
Stewart, 1964) 177 at 192. This interpretation also gives no hint of Quebec's special interests
in the field of property and civil rights: limits judged respectful of Quebec's civil law tradition
apply to other provinces.
96 See also Dickson, J.'s minority opinion in A.G. Canada v. CN. Transportation Ltd,
[1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, 3 D.LR. (4th) 16 [hereinafter CN. Transportation cited to D.L.R.] where
he describes jurisdictional federalism in the relationship between the criminal law power and
the power over the administration of justice. He suggests that some federal statutes may only
be enforced by the provinces, while others would have federal enforcement.
97 See, for example, Interprovincial Cooperatives, supra, note 60.
98 See TN.T. Canada Ina v. Ontario (1986), 1 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 109 (Ont. C.A.).
99 Supra, note 8, s. 92(2). However, it may be possible for provinces to use their
licensing powers to overcome this restriction: see B. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 1969) at 766.
100 Constitution Act 1867, supra, note 8, s. 92(9). This power limits provinces to issuing
licences for the purpose of raising revenue. Commentators like Laskin have suggested that
licences may be issued also under ss 92(13) and (16): ibid at 765. However, courts appear
to recognize only the inclusion of a licensing power under section 92(16) for matters of
intraprovincial trade where the licence relates to raising revenue or the cost of administering
a regulatory regime: see Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dary Products Bd, [1938] A.C. 708,
[1938] 4 D.L.R. 81 (P.C.).
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federal government may legislate criminal law.101 Jurisdictional
federalism therefore produces a difficult result. It creates a system
of joint dependency over the environment. Neither level of
government has sufficient authority to enact comprehensive
environmental regulation.
This unsatisfactory consequence of jurisdictional federalism
suggests a need to re-examine the basic doctrines of Canadian
federalism. This re-examination may begin with the constitution
itself. For instance, it is possible to read into the constitution a
federal-provincial relationship that gives greater power to the federal
side. Beyond the three general federal powers of criminal law, trade
and commerce, and POGG, the federal government possesses various
constitutional trump cards. Three deserve attention. In the first
place, the federal government has major powers over public
finances.102 Secondly, the federal government can declare any work
or undertaking to be exclusively federal.103 This power specifically
trumps provincial powers over local works and undertakings104 and
local and private matters.105 Thirdly, although it has not used this
power recently,106 the federal government has the power to disallow
any provincial legislation.107 Cumulatively, these powers suggest that
101 The courts, not considering any environmental law to be predominantly a question
of morality, have put it exclusively within criminal law. For their part, however, the provinces
have avoided the use of criminal remedies like medium or long-term jail sentences for
environmental offences.
102 See notes 145-59 and the accompanying text for discussion on the federal spending
and taxation powers.
103 Supra, note 8, s. 92(10). For use of this power, see K. Hanssen, 'Te Federal
Declaratory Power under the British North America Act" (1968) 3 Man. L. 3. 87. See also
infra, note 140.
104 Supra, note 8, s. 92(10).
105 Ibid., s. 92(16).
106 For discussion of this power, see Re Disallowance and Reservation, [1938] S.C.R. 71,
Hogg, supra, note 80 at 90, and K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1980) at 224-25.
1 0 7 Supra, note 8, s. 90.
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the federal government has a very broad supervisory jurisdiction.108
However, one must relate these powers to Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence.
2. Principles and counter-principles: Patrick Monahan's work on
Canadian federalism
A centralist reading of the Canadian Constitution is not
common. It conflicts with the notion of federalism as a compact of
equality between the two levels of Canadian government, 10 9 where
equality means separate but equal. To understand how this view of
equality has influenced Canadian federalism, one should turn to
Patrick Monahan's recent work on the history of Canadian
federalism.
110
Monahan examines Canadian federalism as a dialectical
development. The dialectical side to his work comes through his
emphasis on principles and counter-principles, or more simply,
through emphasis on competing paradigms!1  Monahan distin-
guishes two eras of federalism, each era dominated by a different
paradigm. The first era has the ideals of legal formalism as its
dominant paradigm. According to these ideals, the task of judicial
decision-making reduces to analyzing the constitutional document:
decision-making is strictly a textual exercise, giving rise to right
answers. This era of legal interpretation shows a strong convergence
between legal positivism and scientific positivism. Law is a question
108 So significant are the formal powers possessed by the federal government that
constitutional experts like Wheare, supra, note 106 at 17-20, did not regard Canada's structure
as a genuine federalism.
109 See Reference Re The Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935 at 942 (P.C.);
Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), and LP. Pigeon, 'The Meaning of Provincial
Autonomy" in Lederman, ed., supra, note 95, 35 at 36.
110 Supra, note 10.
III Monahan, ibid at n. 6 and 9, borrows these terms from the work of Roberto Unger.
However, at other times, Monahan uses the term paradigm to describe the types of Canadian
federalism. I think the term paradigm better suits this usage. Principles are what judges
explicitly discuss in their judgments. What Monahan describes are not reducible to particular
cases: they are generalizations defining groups of cases.
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of objective truth, not values.112  The constitutional text provides
clear rights of absolute entitlement: there is no living interaction.
Formalism gave rise to exclusive categories of legislative jurisdiction:
if a matter fell within provincial jurisdiction, it could not fall within
federal jurisdiction.
113
Yet the era was marked also by a competing paradigm,
which is less explicit.114 This paradigm assumed that constitutional
interpretation was a practical matter, not a question of ultimate
truth. Constitutional interpretation involved balancing federal and
provincial interests!7 5  There was no need for exclusive categories
of legislative jurisdiction; benefits could result from each side
controlling different aspects of a matter.
In the second era of Canadian federalism, the dialectic
reversed itself.116  What was the dominant paradigm retreated into
the background, while the minority paradigm became the majority
viewpoint, with one twist: Monahan considers the second model to
adhere to utilitarianism, not pragmatism.11 7 Here, Monahan follows
an argument provided by W.R. Lederman in the 1950s.1
8
Lederman recommended that the courts retreat from their formal
112 Ibid. at 55.
113 This is the mutual modification approach to constitutional interpretation: see supra,
note 95.
114 Monahan, supra, note 10 at 59.
115 Ibid. at 59.
116 Ibid at 56.
117 Ibid. at 65. While these two philosophies have some similarities, utilitarianism is a
more radical position for courts than pragmatism. Pragmatism calls for courts to adopt a
result-oriented approach to legal reasoning, but it does not prevent reliance on past doctrines
to build current decisions. By contrast, utilitarian reasoning encourages the complete
abandonment of the past in favour of a calculus providing the greatest good for the greatest
number. This calculation seems to leave little legitimacy for judicial decision-making since
legislators seem better able to make this determination.
118 Ibid at 64 n. 65. See Lederman, supra, note 95 at 177-99.
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analysis and adopt a more realistic' 19 assessment of federalism issues.
Monahan focuses on the utilitarian aspect of this realism
20
Monahan's utilitarian emphasis overstates his case. The
Supreme Court of Canada has never affirmed utilitarian reasoning
or utility as a constitutional value.1 21  The closest doctrine to
utilitarianism used by the Supreme Court is the national concern
doctrine of POGG. This doctrine appears to make any matter federal
if that matter is in the interest of the country as a whole. But even
this doctrine is not strongly utilitarian. National concerns do not
include concerns like inflation or the environment where the
concern is simply a collection of provincial powers under a new
heading. Secondly, the test for national concerns limits some
utilitarian features in order to respect provincial autonomy.
Therefore, utilitarianism continues to lack clear judicial support.122
3. Functionalism and geographical federalism in Canada
That Monahan's second model does not fit with Canadian
jurisprudence does not, however, undermine his insight that
federalism follows certain paradigms. It simply forces one to re-
examine the tradition for alternative paradigms. One option is to
examine the relationship between utilitarianism and functionalism.
Unlike utilitarianism, functionalism has received explicit judicial
endorsement in federalism matters.123 However, functionalism can
119 This term covers both pragmatism and utilitarianism. Legal Realism in the United
States has been described as both pragmatic and sociological jurisprudence. Lederman adopts
aspects of both positions: he supports the utilitarian "sociological jurisprudence," ibid. at 189-
90; and he supports pragmatism's results orientation within the system of precedent, ibid. at
190.
120 Monahan, supra, note 10 at 65.
121 Lederman, supra, note 95 at 189, mentioned no cases in support of this point.
Though Monahan cites Laskin's scholarship to support his point, ibid at n. 72, Laskin's
judicial work admits no support for this view.
122 Note that Monahan thinks both doctrines are coherent only under a utilitarian vision
of federalism: supra, note 10 at 72-73.
123 See Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la Santd de la Securite du travail) (1988),
51 D.LR. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Bell Canada]. See also D. Reaume, "'he Judicial
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work at many levels, so it is not always clear what these judicial
endorsements amount to. Functionalism has a place as a
supplement to the traditional, mutual modification approach to
constitutional classification. In this limited role, functionalism leads
a court to ask whether a legal distinction is usefully implemented.
Here, functionalism adds values like administrative efficiency to
constitutional decision-making. Equally, it makes social science
research relevant to constitutional law without undermining
precedent.
What about functionalism on a larger scale? Traditionally,
states have served certain basic functions regarding the economy,
police, and culture. However, it is difficult to describe the Canadian
state along these lines. This type of functionalism does not clarify
the division of powers between the two levels of government
because each level possesses powers over each function.
124
However, functionalism is not restricted to these three categories.
Indeed, it may apply to the very basis of federalism: the view that
two governments possessing the full complement of state powers is
better than one. To take a functional view of this division of
powers, one need not turn directly to economic and cultural
divisions, only to the different regions covered by each level of
government. Here, functionalism suggests that the larger
government concerns itself with those matters which affect the
whole and the smaller governments concern themselves with those
matters having a local impact.
This view of functionalism leads Canadian federalism
towards "regional assessment," an assessment of whether a reform is
most suited to provincial or federal geographic scope. Regional
assessment resembles the American approach to federalism.1 25 Yet
one can also find a strand of Canadian jurisprudence adopting
regional assessment. The basis of regional assessment in Canada
Philosophy of Bora Laskin" (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 438, and W. R. Lederman, Continuing
Canadian Constitution Dilemmas (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) c. 23 at 388.
124 See Garth Stevenson, "Federalism and the Political Economy of the Canadian State"
in L. Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1977) at 71-100.
125 See notes 87-93 and the accompanying text.
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consists of the powers supporting geographic federalism. While
jurisdictional federalism focuses on section 92(13) of the
constitution, geographic federalism focuses on POGO and section
92(16). In section 92(16), the provinces assert general authority
over matters of a local and private nature. When this provincial
authority over local and private matters is considered in relation to
the federal POGG power over national concerns, the primary colours
of regional assessment appear.
Regional assessment should not be described as the true
colour of Canadian federalism. The Canadian constitution is so
centred in specifics that general interpretations must pick and
choose between emphases. My assertion is that the provincial
powers include another general power alongside the widely
acknowledged power over property and civil rights. Strong support
for this alternative vision of provincial powers is found in Rand J.'s
judgment in Reference Re The Farm Products Marketing Act,126 and
Beetz J.'s judgment in A.G. Canada v. Dupond 27 Moreover,
several other judgments play a supporting role.1 28 Justice Rand's
judgment in Reference Re Farm Products provides a regional vision
of Canadian federalism through a two-stage argument. The case
involved a dispute over Ontario marketing legislation, with the
federal government asserting jurisdiction over interprovincial trade
and commerce. The first stage of Rand J.'s argument tried to
neutralize the property and civil rights power of the provinces by
emphasizing section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal
126 [1957] S.C.R. 198, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257 [hereinafter Reference Re Farm Products cited
to D.L.R.].
127 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 420 [hereinafter Dupond cited to D.L.R.].
128 See, for example, Beetz J.'s judgment in Anti-Inflation Reference supra; note 56,
Pigeon J.'s judgment in Interprovincial Cooperatives supra, note 60, and Laskin J.'s dissenting
judgments favouring the enclave theory in Construction Montcalm v. Minimum Wage
Commission, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 754, and in Cardinal v. A.G. Alberta, [1974] S.C.R. 695
[hereinafter Cardinal]. Beetz J.'s judgment in Bell Canada, supra, note 123, has recently
revived many of the principles of the enclave theory exempting federally regulated undertaking
from provincial laws. Since this case involved provincial occupational health and safety law,
it has relevance for the application of provincial environmental regulation to federally-
regulated activities. Bell Canada exempts federal undertakings from any provincial orders
(since they are, by their nature, not general in application) and any laws affecting the
management of the undertaking. Such laws include laws substituting for "normal" management
decisions such as working conditions and the operation of a facility.
1989]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
power to unify the property and civil rights of all the common law
provinces. This federal power meant that property and civil rights
was not wholly outside federal jurisdiction. It was therefore
insufficient for a province to assert that any matter involving
property and civil rights was provincial in essence.1 29  The second
stage of Rand J.'s argument set out section 92(16) as the basis of
provincial authority over intraprovincial trade. This allowed Justice
Rand to balance the judicial concern for provincial autonomy with
a functional concern for commercial integration.
Beetz J.'s judgment in Dupond130 articulated this vision of
regional authority in relation to the federal power over criminal law.
Dupond concerned municipal by-laws enacted by the City of
Montreal that limited the rights of assembly in the city. The case
raised important issues regarding the status of fundamental freedoms
under the division of powers. The federal government argued that
fundamental freedoms were an exclusive part of the federal criminal
law power, only to be abridged by federal authority. Chief Justice
Laskin supported this view in dissent.1 31 Justice Beetz received the
support of the majority for his view that municipalities had
jurisdiction under a provincial delegation of authority over local and
private matters.
1 32
Reliance on regional assessment to deal with comprehensive
environmental regulation like the CEPA places the debate on
federalism on a simpler footing. The murkiness of Canadian
federalism derives from judicial reliance on the section 92(13) power
over property and civil rights. Courts and constitutional
commentators describe this power as the general provincial power,
129 However, Justice Rand ignores that section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra,
note 8, does not apply to Quebec.
1 3 0 Supra, note 127.
131 Laskin CJ. even goes further "The only local or private aspect is ... the territorial
ambit of the By-law ... and this has never been a test of constitutional validity," Dupond,
supra, note 127 at 423. Yet elsewhere Laskin was a strong supporter of a territorial theory
known as the enclave theory: see note 128.
132 Beetz J. provides an extremely strong reading of the territorial basis of provincial
jurisdiction. He finds the other provincial powers, including property and civil rights, simply
illustrative of this general provincial power. see Dupond, supra, note 127 at 436.
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not the power over local and private matters.133 However, the
analysis of matters into the categories of property and civil rights
versus trade and commerce, for example, leaves a court with an
apples and oranges kind of problem. There is no clear basis on
which to judge the fit of the legislation into either category. By
contrast, regional assessment emphasizes similarly based powers. A
further aspect of regional assessment is its scope to analyze several
levels of conflict. In most instances, regional assessment would
analyze conflicts between the federal POGG power and the provincial
power over local and private matters1 34 This would apply to
general federal proposals as well as federal efforts to implement
treaties.1 3 5  However, regional assessment would also help analyze
conflicts between laws for federal laws and provincial laws of general
application. Here, the provincial side would argue for uniformity,
the federal side for the local autonomy.
136
Regional assessment still allows courts considerable
flexibility. It remains consistent with the doctrine of severability, for
example.137 Severability would allow a court to uphold a federal
133 See K. Swinton, "Comment: A.G. Canada v. Dupond' (1979) 57 Can. Bar Rev. 326
at 330.
134 To appreciate the impact of section 92(16), examine the current extensions of the
CEPA into local and private matters. Currently, the CEPA encompasses, for example, local
practices involving the use, storage, transportation, and disposal of toxic substances. It sets
out no provision restricting it from the regulation of local service stations, dry cleaning
operations, and paint stores. Additionally, it appears capable of extending to all disposal
plants - regulating their construction, maintenance, and inspection. Further, the Act extends
into local and private matters with respect to the provincial power over municipal government.
The Act appears to cover urban waste disposal over toxins where, to this point, municipal
governments have had major responsibilities over solid waste disposal (and provinces have
controlled toxic waste disposal: see The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302, ss 210(83)-(86)
and The Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, s. 136(4), R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 309).
135 This vision of federalism also holds promise for the incorporation of international
environmental laws. The geographic basis of federalism makes it easier to assess the pith and
substance of treaty implementation: see Employment and Social Insurance Reference, supra,
note 60.
136 To relate regional assessment to the tradition of constitutional jurisprudence, one
should include not just the national concern doctrine, but also the enclave theory and the
"occupied field" theory. While Justice Laskin claimed in Dupond, supra, note 127, that
geography has never been a basis of federalism, he applied the "enclave" theory to native lands
and federal works and undertakings in Cardinal, supra, note 128.
137 See Hogg, supra, note 79.
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scheme, while restricting its entry into local and private matters. In
the context of cradle-to-grave regulation, this doctrine could help
establish the reach of federal legislation. A court may decide that
some aspects of the CEPA or some regulations are unconstitutional
without striking down the whole scheme.
The second element of judicial flexibility not affected by
regional assessment are the concurrency and paramountcy doctrines.
A court could hold to an exclusive view of federal and provincial
matters, thus fimiting the scope of concurrency and paramountcy.
However, a court could also hold that there is broad overlap
between national and provincial matters, and rely on the various
paramountcy tests to determine particular results1 38
Regional assessment is also compatible with other elements
of the Canadian constitution. Its use is not restricted to
environmental matters. It may apply to economic matters where
questions arise on the characterization of problems as interprovincial
or intraprovincial.13 9 It ,may also allow greater flexibility in
distinguishing between the needs for cultural protection and
economic integration. Whereas the current reliance on the property
and civil rights power extends to all provinces the cultural protection
which Quebec needs, a future reliance on regional assessment may
promote a more limited scope for the property and civil rights
power. This scope would have more specific regard for Quebec's
needs.
Therefore, regional assessment provides the first image of
law as conversation. It fits within the conversational model of
constitutional discourse not only because it places debate on a more
rational footing, but also because it does not fit within an absolute
rights framework. A court's determination of a particular issue as
local or national does not permanently handcuff either level of
government. Governments could marshall new facts or argue
alternative circumstances to support changes to their respective
positions. Moreover, regional assessment may be kept in line with
138 Paramountcy and concurrency will be discussed below. See notes 178-81 and the
accompanying text.
139 This point may receive La Forest J.'s rebuke that it uses a fight on the environmental
plane to take up a "war that was lost on the economic plane in the Canadian new deal cases,"
Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 53 at 49.
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the judicial model of historical prudence so that the question of
which level of government may best implement certain reforms could
be answered with regard to Canadian history. The advantage of the
regional test, however, is that it is not limited to tradition. It does
not lose its value when one confronts a social concern like pollution
or the environment that has suddenly assumed huge importance.
Equally, regional assessment may give new life to old powers
40
The principal limitation of regional assessment is that it
suggests a major shift in the balance of power towards the federal
side.141 Under the current approach, the property and civil rights
power has controlled federal powers. Although regional assessment
suggests that the federal government may enter any field in the
national interest, several factors mitigate. First, regional assessment
would be placed in a context where courts are familiar with federal
tactics and where the courts have provided unilateral limits142 on
federal powers, limits like the current POGG principles. Secondly, in
comparison to the majority judgment in Crown Zellerbach, regional
assessment may provoke courts to more thoroughly analyze the
factual basis for the federal action. For example, any examination
of the national dimensions of the cEPA should depend on some
factual background dealing with small generators and the flow of
toxic chemicals across provincial boundaries.143 Thirdly, unless the
courts return to a hard line position on the exclusiveness of
constitutional powers, the provinces could continue to exercise
broad jurisdiction over provincial problems, limited only by conflicts
with federal initiatives.
140 Regional assessment brings new importance to the federal power to declare a work
or undertaking in the national interest: Constitution Act 1867, supra, note 8, s. 92(10)(c).
In the current constitutional framework, this power has lacked frequent use. This should
remind us that the current constitutional paradigm also fails to describe the "full" constitution.
Note that the section 92(10)(c) power brings the review of federalism closer to the reasoning
process of the Charter. Regional assessment places section 92(10)(c) in the same relation to
judicial decisions as section 33 stands in relation to section 1 and the various rights under the
Charter. Both powers may trump judicial decisions. See also note 103.
141 Note, however, that Dupond, supra, note 127, shows an increase in provincial powers.
142 By unilateral limits, I mean court-imposed limits that apply to the federal powers
without reference to any particular provincial powers.
143 See supra, note 35, for the small generators exemption, and Lucas, supra, note 2, at
366 for the extra-provincial aspect of persistent wastes.
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In addition to increased flexibility in the interpretation of
the Canadian constitution, regional assessment moves legal decision-
making more in line with modem social and economic policy-
making. Although policy-makers acknowledge the cultural demands
of Quebec, they cannot be expected to distinguish much else apart
from regional and national interests. Therefore, it is these basic,
non-legal considerations which ground the kinds of legislation now
being proposed by Canadian governments. By relating the legal
tradition of federalism to modem policy-making, and by insisting
that legislation depend upon a rational connection to social and
economic facts, the legitimacy of constitutional decision-making can
only improve.
B. Dialogue with the Provinces: Federal-Provincial Cooperation and
Comprehensive Environmental Regulation
The second image of law as conversation is federal-
provincial dialogue. This dialogue moves away from the exclusively
legal discussion of the previous section to link judicial decisions on
federalism with administrative arrangements between the two levels
of government. This section focuses on the ways the federal
government may overcome its constitutional limitations by
implementing comprehensive environmental schemes through
cooperative arrangements with the provinces. It explores three basic
models of cooperative federalism.
1 44
1. Model one: cooperation and the federal spending power
Today, one of the most controversial federal practices for
surmounting constitutional limitations is the use of the federal
spending power.1 45 This controversy hampers the use of the most
144 See J.R. Mallory, "'he Five Faces of Federalism" in J.P. Meekison, ed., Canadian
Federalism: Myth or Reality?, 2d ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1971) 55 at 61.
145 This power derives from section 91(1A), supra, note 8, the power over public debt
and property. See generally N. Finkelstein, ed., Laskin's Constitutional Law, vol. 2, 5th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 782-89.
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extensive federal mechanism of cooperation in Canadian history.
Until recently, the spending power was regarded as one of the few
areas of Canadian federalism where federal power was virtually
unlimited.1 46 Judicial decisions maintained the spending power as
one exception to the trend of weakening national power in favour
of provincial interests. For example, according to the Privy Council
in Employment and Social Insurance Reference, the spending power
was the logical consequence of the federal government's ability to
raise money by any means of taxation under section 91(3). However
such revenue is raised, the federal government has full discretion on
ways to spend it.147 This broad power has had great influence on
federal-provincial cooperation: it has meant that the federal
government could fund any program including programs within
provincial powers. With medicare, for example, the federal spending
power has allowed poorer provinces to provide a higher level of
health care.
So characterized, the spending power has two applications
to environmental regulation. It allows the federal government to
subsidize certain environmental activities; and it allows the federal
government to regulate provincial environmental regulation where
provinces need federal financial support. Both approaches show
some promise for the cEPA.
Examples of the first use of the spending power are the
federal subsidies for pollution control.148  But the federal
government could go further by tying environmental considerations
into all activities benefiting from federal funding, such as the federal
programs for regional economic development. Without debating
their legitimacy,149 environmentalists could nevertheless suggest that
these grants should incorporate environmental controls. This
146 See G.V. La Forest, The Allocation of Taxing Power Under the Constitution (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1967) c. 31-35.
147 See Finkelstein, supra, note 145 at 63, and Hogg, supra, note 79 at 127.
148 See supra, note 59. Note also the U.S. example of grants dealing with hazardous
waste problems: see the U.S. Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, supra, note 7,
§§ 6984-86.
149 See A. Careless, Initiative and Response: The Adaptation of Canadian Federalisn to
Regional Economic Development (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977) at 204-12.
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extension would be compatible with the emphasis of the CEPA on
increased environmental control over federal crown activities.
150
Historically, the second use of the federal spending power
has been very significant. Under this heading falls the practice of
conditional grants: federal money is granted to a province on the
condition that it satisfy federal rules. Although conditional grants
threaten federalism, they are constitutional 51 Moreover, they are
widespread: conditional grants have gone hand-in-hand with the
development of the Canadian welfare state.
152
Conditional grants related to cradle-to-grave regulation could
create federal controls in several areas of provincial jurisdiction. In
standard setting, conditional grants could be used to ensure uniform
environmental standards. Equally, such grants could apply to
enforcement practices of the provinces - again, to ensure provincial
uniformity and avoid pollution havens. However, politics and not
law make it unlikely that conditional grants would be used for the
CEPA. Recent trends in federal-provincial relations suggest that
conditional grants are in decline 53 Their decline is partly because
they have ignored the basic condition of federalism, that the country
has various regions with different demands 5 4 Provinces reject the
150 This suggestion also ties in with the recent Federal Court decisions on the Federal
Environmental Assessment Review Process [hereinafter EARP]: see CdiL Wildlife Federation
v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) (1989), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 1 (F.C.A.). Enterprises
receiving federal monies are within section 6(c) of the Federal Environmental Assessnent and
Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84-467. A similar provision exists in section 5(b) of
the new federal reform: Bill C-78, An Act to Establish a Federal Assessment Process, 2d Sess.,
34th Pan., 1990 (first reading 18 June 1990). However, the CEPA may only extend to this
area if its definition of federal works and undertakings is amended in line with the EARP
definition. Currently, the CEPA does not extend to federally funded works and undertakings.
151 See K. Hanssen, 'The Constitutionality of Conditional Grant Legislation" (1967) 2
Man. L.J. 191. Note also that conditional grants exist in the U.S. system of federalism: see
R.B. Stewart, "Pyramids of Sacrifice: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy" (1977) 86 Yale Li. 1196 at 1250-62.
152 See K. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1987) at 172-73.
153 See D.V. Smiley, Canada In Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3d ed. (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980) at 178.
154 For an examination of problems associated with the federal spending power, see A.
Petter, "Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power' (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev.
448.
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notion that the central government best appreciates the needs of
each region.
The federal spending power is also significantly limited by
the federal power to raise money. In short, the federal government
may not raise monies for provincial purposes1 5 5 This limits the
federal government's ability to directly match taxes and
expenditures 5 6 This limitation applies to any superfund spending
program where waste disposal sites are local and private matters.
15
This limitation on the federal taxing power influences the way the
federal government uses the spending power: it drops the ideas of
matching and special taxes. Instead, it funds all of its spending
power schemes using monies drawn from general tax monies. Both
current uses of the spending power rely on this type of funding.
These restrictions on the federal spending power are
difficult to criticize within the perspective of federalism as dialogue.
The spending power entrenches a hierarchical image of federal-
provincial relations - a hierarchy where the federal government
ranks supreme and may dictate terms to the provinces. Within this
theory of law, other more balanced forms of federal-provincial
cooperation hold greater promise for tackling environmental
problems in a comprehensive way.
155 This limitation is not expressly stated in the constitution; indeed, the constitution
implies that the federal government may raise money for any purpose by any means of
taxation, while provinces may only raise money by direct taxation for provincial purposes.
Where concurrency is assumed, there is no federal exclusion from provincial tax powers. On
an exclusive view of constitutional powers, the constitution suggests that only the federal
government may raise money by indirect taxation for provincial purposes. No court case has
limited the federal authority in this area, however, the Privy Council considered this type of
federal tax unlikely in Caron v. R, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 1005. On the other hand, some legal
commentators have suggested that the provinces may fill this field of indirect taxation for
provincial purposes through section 92(16), but they have yet to receive judicial support: see
Laskin, supra, note 94 at 670, referring to Kennedy and Wells.
156 This type of matching exists in the United States in the "superfund" governing the
sites of toxic chemicals' disposal. See the CERCLA, supra, note 60.
157 As local and private, such sites are under exclusive provincial control. Therefore,
taxes to fund such sites would be taxes for provincial purposes and therefore outside federal
powers. Reliance on the POGG power for this proposal would be difficult because of the
"provincial inability" requirement. However, one option is the federal power to declare such
disposal sites to be works for the general advantage of Canada under section 92(10)(c). This
power could support a national system of dumpsites, transfer stations, and incinerators.
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2. Model two: cooperation and federal-provincial concurrency
The second model of Canadian cooperative federalism arises
in areas where federal and provincial powers are concurrent. Here,
federal and provincial involvement are equally legitimate: both
levels of government may pass valid legislation. Concurrency arises
in two ways: through the constitution itself and through judicial
decisions. Environmental law has examples of each type.
a) Agricultural concurrency and the regulation of pesticides
The constitution clearly provides for concurrent jurisdiction
in the areas of immigration and agriculture.158 On the assumption
that concurrency in agriculture has placed pesticidal regulation
within federal powers, this concurrency has importance for
environmentalists. Before examining the validity of this assumption,
one ought to study the form of Canadian pesticidal regulation.
Canadian pesticidal laws show federal-provincial cooperation
along the "separate but equal" model. Each level of government
focuses on different aspects of pesticidal regulation159 and each
performs a different function. The federal government focuses on
pesticide registration;16° the provincial governments focus on
pesticide use.161 Together, the two government schemes provide
the earliest Canadian attempt at comprehensive environmental
regulation.
Because the pesticidal scheme suggests comprehensiveness,
one ought to appreciate the role of concurrent jurisdiction in the
scheme. If the scheme is completely dependent upon concurrent
158 Supra, note 8, s. 95.
159 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Pesticides in Canada: An Examination of
Federal Law and Policy by J.F. Castrilli & T. Vigod (Ottawa: The Commission, 1987) at 40.
160 See Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9.
161 Ontario, for example, has enacted the Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 376. However,
note that pesticide usage may have an interprovincial aspect requiring federal regulation: see
Interprovincial Cooperatives, supra, note 53, and section 54(1) of the CEPA, supra, note 3,
which covers this aspect of pesticide control.
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jurisdiction, it supports the view that jurisdictional federalism needs
to be replaced by a federalism of greater concurrency. Although
there is no jurisprudence on the constitutional basis of the pesticidal
schemes,1 62 jurisprudence on the agriculture power provides some
assistance. The latter shows that the courts define that power
cautiously.1 63 Mirroring their interpretation of the federal power
over trade and commerce, courts have neutralized the federal
agriculture power by defining its jurisdiction narrowly. Although
section 95 explicitly provides federal powers over interprovincial and
intraprovincial matters, and although the section emphasizes federal
paramountcy, the courts have denied the federal government this
scope. Courts have interpreted this agriculture power in terms of
the division of powers in sections 91 and 92. The courts' practice
in defining the agriculture power provides an explanation for the
scope of the federal pesticide legislation. Federal laws for pesticidal
registration resemble the federal law for food and drug registration,
another federal responsibility!64
If this judicial practice defines the pesticide scheme,
however, the constitutional provision of concurrency is not helpful
to either level of government. The normal division of powers relies
on exclusiveness, not concurrency. If the federal government can
only produce legislation resembling other federal legislation, there is
nothing unique about the contribution of concurrent power in
agriculture. Moreover, if the exclusiveness of powers, and not
concurrency, divides the federal and provincial functions over
agriculture, these divisions in the pesticidal schemes have less to do
with rational consensus between the two levels of government and
more to do with the traditional spheres of influence. The federal
government would not control pesticide registration simply because
the provinces agree that it is more effective; nor would provinces
control pesticide usage because of federal recognition of provincial
162 Castrilli & Vigod, supra, note 159 at 40 notes that in Re Forest Protection Limited
and Guerin (1978), 7 C.E.L.R. 93 (N.B.Q.B.) a constitutional argument was raised and
dropped.
163 See Gibson, supra, note 1 at 67.
164 The food and drug law relies, however, on the very narrow criminal law power see
Standard Sausage, supra, note 43. The other possible source of regulatory power is POGG:
see notes 42-45 and the accompanying text.
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efficiencies. A lack of policy agreement also detracts from any
presumption that Canadian pesticidal regulation follows a scheme.
Instead, one should presume that each government deals with only
that part of the problem familiar to it; no one deals with the whole.
This reliance on the traditional division of powers to define
the agriculture power does have a hidden benefit for the federal
government. It allows the federal government to regulate all
pesticides, whether they are agricultural pesticides or, for example,
pesticides related to forest production.1 s The only peculiarity is
that the Minister of Agriculture regulates all pesticides and related
products, including forest herbicides 66
An understanding of Canadian pesticide regulation is helpful
to understanding comprehensive environmental reform like cradle-
to-grave regulation. Powers divided between the two levels of
government in pesticide regulation are entirely claimed by the
federal government in the cradle-to-grave scheme of the cEPA.
While, the federal regulation of pesticides limits itself to the
registration of pesticides, and allows the provinces to regulate
particular uses, the federal cradle-to-grave scheme regulates both the
general registration and the particular uses of toxic chemicals.
167
This broad view of federal powers is controversial because the
federal power over pesticides may formally rely on the plenary
constitutional power that the federal government has over
agriculture. If the courts have restricted the federal agriculture
power by bringing it in line with the powers accorded the federal
government under the normal division of powers, how can these
same "normal" powers give the federal government a jurisdiction in
toxic chemicals that it lacks for pesticides? An examination of
165 The fact that the development, conservation and management of forest resources
was specifically mentioned in section 92A of the Constitution Act 1867, supra, note 8, suggests
that forestry does not come under the agriculture power of its section 95.
166 The CEPA does nothing to change this situation. The only potential role available
for CEPA in pesticides is regulation of the situation judged federal in Interprovincial
Cooperatives, supra, note 60. See supra, note 161, for the potential role of the CEPA in
pesticide regulation.
167 For example, the Ontario Pesticides Act, supra, note 161, regulates the licensing of
pesticides, the persons using pesticides, and the disposal of pesticides. All three of these
aspects are within the federal scheme of cradle-to-grave regulation: see the CEPA, supra,
note 3, s. 34(1).
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the pesticide regime suggests therefore that the federal government
lacks power over the "grave-side" regulation of toxins. Without this
scope, however, the federal regulation is no longer comprehensive
regulation: it shares one of the major shortcomings of its
predecessor, the EcI. Thus, either the analogy between pesticides
and toxic chemicals is constitutionally unsound, or the cradle-to-
grave regulation of toxic chemicals requires joint federal-provincial
legislation.
One way of disputing the analogy between pesticides and
toxic substances is to distinguish between the types of concurrency.
If pesticides lie within the agriculture power, pesticidal regulation
exists within a concurrency formally declared in the constitution. In
this context, pesticidal regulation simply follows the Privy Council
policy that Canada involves a "separate but equal" compact between
two levels of government. Without assigning limits to the federal
agriculture power, the provincial power could be nonexistent.168
The constitution, however, allows for other types of concurrency
beyond that provided for agriculture.
b) Transportation concurrency and regulation of dangerous goods
For environmentalists assessing the scope for comprehensive
environmental regulation in Canada, the federal-provincial scheme
governing the transportation of dangerous goods provides another
example of concurrency. The scheme for dangerous goods differs
from the complete separation of functions present in the pesticidal
regime. It links concurrency with geographic distinctness. Relying
on the constitutional distinction between interprovincial and
intraprovincial works and undertakings, the scheme for dangerous
goods assumes that the federal government has exclusive authority
over interprovincial transportation while the provincial governments
168 The application of the normal concurrency and paramountcy doctrines to section
95 of the Constitution Act, supra, note 8, would give the federal government broad, supervisory
jurisdiction. Provincial jurisdiction would extend only to those areas not regulated by the
federal government.
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have authority over intraprovincial transportation. 69 Because this
scheme revolves around geographic distinctions, it offers some
insight into the combination of geographic federalism with
government administrative practices in Canada.
Legislation for dangerous goods arose in response to several
serious incidents, including a major train derailment in Mississauga,
Ontario and a chemical spill on a northern Ontario highway.
170
This system relies on both levels of government enacting legislation
in their sphere of authority towards a common goal. The federal
government enacted the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act.
171
The provinces were expected to enact provincial legislation and have
now done so.
172
Within the scheme for the TDGA, the federal government
also addressed an issue not covered in the pesticide scheme:
uniformity. Because the pesticidal powers are separated into
registration and use, Canadians have no guarantee that all provinces
will provide legislation on pesticidal use. This absence detracts from
the comprehensiveness of the scheme. The scheme for the TDGA
tries to remedy this problem. To ensure that it is comprehensive for
all parts of Canada, the federal legislation claims to govern all
transportation in the absence of a provincial law.173  But the
constitution gives the province power over intraprovincial highway
169 This distinction works for trucking: see A.G. Ontario v. Winner, [1954] A.C. 541
(P.C.). In the other major transportation areas, the federal government has augmented its
"natural" constitutional power through special powers. While the Constitution Act 1867 gave
the federal government power over shipping under section 91(10), the federal government took
control of railways in Canada through the declaratory power of section 92(10)(c) and of air
transportation in Canada through POGG as explained in Re Regulation and Control of
Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 58 (P.C.).
170 See E.M. Vomberg, "Regulating the Transportation of Dangerous Goods" (1983) 21
Alta. L Rev. 488.
171 R.S.C. 1985, c. T-19 [hereinafter TDGA].
172 P.M. Bird & DJ. Rappont, State of the Environmen; 1986 (Ottawa: Environment
Canada, 1986) at 237 lists the provinces of Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and the
Northwest Territories as having their own schemes. Now, all of the provinces have enacted
legislation. In Ontario, see the Dangerous Goods Transportation Act 1981 S.O. 1981, c. 69.
173 If there is no provincial legislation after twelve months, the federal legislation applies
inside the province as if it were provincial legislation: TDGA, supra, note 171, s. 32(4). The
constitutionality of this provision is discussed briefly by Vomberg, supra, note 170 at n. 173ff.
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transportation,174 and it gives the federal government powers over
transportation only as they relate to interprovincial works and
undertakings. Thus, can the federal government make good on the
claim made by the TDGA?
It appears that the only way that the federal government
may enter the field of the intraprovincial transportation of
dangerous goods is through the national concern doctrine of POGG.
Although the legislation preceded the test formulation in Crown
Zellerbach, the federal legislation appears capable of satisfying it.1 75
First, the field of dangerous goods possesses distinctness and
autonomy to distinguish it from general transportation regulation.
Secondly, the legislation acknowledges a provincial presence in the
regulation of dangerous goods. However, the TDaA does raise some
difficulty with its paramountcy provisions. The Act is far from
allowing any provincial effort to pre-empt the federal legislation.
Instead, provincial law pre-empts federal occupation of
intraprovincial transportation only where there is federal-provincial
agreement.
176
The TDGA therefore provides two types of important
assistance to environmentalists looking at comprehensive regulation
in Canada. First, it suggests that constitutional concurrency need
not threaten provincial autonomy. Concurrency in transportation
does not mean the federal government will take over the field. The
TDGA preserves provincial power without adopting the functional
separation in the pesticidal scheme between registration and use.
Therefore, the effort in the CEPA to regulate both toxic chemical
174 Provincial Secretary of P.E.I. v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 305
[hereinafter Egan cited to D.L.R.].
175 See Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 53. Although the failure to regulate intra-
provincially may not have extra-provincial impact, the federal government may argue that such
a failure can result in spills which pollute the environment beyond a province's boundaries.
But this situation, similar to that in Interprovincial Cooperatives, supra, note 60, only justifies
the regulation of extraprovincial pollution, not intraprovincial trucking.
176 Absent an agreement, the federal transport Minister retains the discretion to seek
cabinet proclamation of the TDGA for intra-provincial transportation where efforts to reach
an agreement have not been reasonable: supra, note 171, s. 33(4). This provision may be
constitutional in light of POGG. The courts have acknowledged federal efforts to cooperate
where the provinces have used delaying tactics in the case of Munro v. National Capital
Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 753 [hereinafter Munro cited to D.L.R.].
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registration and use may not fall outside constitutional limits.
Secondly, the =DGA suggests that the national concern doctrine in
POGG may allow comprehensive environmental regulation.
Unfortunately, the use of the national concern doctrine in
the TDGA does not resemble its use in the cEPA. While the TDGA
relies on several already-established federal powers over
transportation, the cradle-to-grave regulation in the cEPA enters new
federal ground in environmental regulation. The cradle-to-grave
regulation in the cEPA depends on POGG to enter the field of toxic
chemicals, not just to ensure uniformity. Secondly, in contrast to
the distinctiveness of dangerous goods within the field of
transportation law, the focus of the cEPA on toxic chemicals appears
to lack distinctiveness within the environmental field; indeed, since
the cEPA may eventually apply to hundreds of chemicals, it may
occupy the whole field of environmental regulation in Canada.
Therefore, the absence in the cEPA of an equivalency test similar to
that of the TDGA seems constitutionally unsound.
c) Concurrency and paramountcy in environmental regulation
Concurrency analysis is not complete without examining the
constitutional principle which is the logical consequence of
concurrency: paramountcy. Paramountcy does not arise in an
exclusive reading of the legislative powers because there is no
overlap. If insurance is a matter of property and civil rights, then
it is not part of trade and commerce, for example. However, where
a court decides that each level of government has powers over a
matter, it must decide which power shall prevail. Here, courts have
not played around with functional possibilities. They have not
provided a paramountcy ranking by distinguishing the relative
importance of federal or provincial powers. In a case of conflict,
the paramountcy doctrine in Canada asserts that the valid federal
legislation is paramount.
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Courts have adhered to two paramountcy standards. The
first standard involves the concept of an "occupied field."177
Wherever the federal government claims authority, the province
must keep out. Over time, however, the courts have retreated from
this version of paramountcy. It gave too much to the federal
authority. The second standard provides a more restrictive concept
of paramountcy.1 78 It requires conflict between the legislation or
regulations of the federal and provincial governments for
paramountcy to arise. Here, conflict means contradiction. Valid
provincial legislation is operative unless it compels an individual to
do something that the federal legislation prohibits or limits.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Canada applied a new
paramountcy principle which restored part of the occupied field
concept. In Bank of Montreal v. Hall,1 79 the court denied the
application of provincial law where it conflicted with the pulpose of
federal legislation. It is unclear how this hybrid principle applies to
other conflicts within federalism.
18 0
The CEPA has explicitly incorporated the limited paramountcy
principle as part of the regulation of toxic chemicals.181  The CEPA
177 See Home Insurance Co. and U.S. Fideliy and Guarantee Co. v. Lindal and Beattie,
[1934] 1 D.LR. 497 (S.C.C.), and McKay v. R (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532 (S.C.C.).
178 See Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982), 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.e.C.).
179 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 [hereinafter Hall]; also Finkelstein, supra, note 145 at 290,
indicates a notion of the occupied field that was held in Bisaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R.
60.
180 In the environmental law context, this case has two applications. First, where a
provincial environmental statute affects an activity regulated under a federal statute, it suggests
that the federal scheme may be deemed to occupy a field if its main purpose conflicts with
an environmental purpose. For example, agriculture laws having the purpose of promoting
farming may occupy the farming field from environmental laws. Secondly, Hall, ibid, suggests
that in the environmental field, provincial environmental laws will apply to federally regulated
activities only where the provincial environmental purposes do not conflict with federal
environmental purposes. Thus, an argument exists that if the federal government set a
standard or provided a scheme which balanced economic factors with health or environmental
factors, provincial laws setting tougher environmental standards would not apply because their
purpose conflicts with the federal purpose.
181 In this respect, the CEPA adopts an approach first seen with American federal
environmental legislation. Most American federal environmental legislation contains a
provision allowing state legislation to count as paramount where it provides a harsher standard
than the federal legislation: see, for example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
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allows provincial standards where they are substantially similar or
tougher than the comparable federal standards."8 2 As yet, this
innovation lacks judicial approval. However, given the analogies
between this approach and the earlier approaches in the field of
highway traffic safety,183 judicial disapproval is unlikely.
3. Model three: cooperation and administrative delegation
The third model of cooperation is concurrency with joint
administration. This is achieved by delegating one government's
authority to an administrative authority controlled by the other level
of government. Delegation has long been part of the administrative
practice of authorizing administrators to make ministerial decisions.
If the delegation occurs within one level of government, there is no
issue of federalism.184 The difficulties arise where the delegation
affects the federal division of powers. These may occur through the
delegation of the administrative, judicial, executive, or legislative
powers. Delegation raises three questions: what is legitimate by
law; what can be agreed to by the respective governments; and what
is best for the administration of a particular scheme?
Under the general legal principles of delegation, neither
level of government may delegate legislative powers to the other.
185
However, the courts have gradually weakened this principle by
authorizing the delegation of administrative and executive powers
which resemble legislative delegations.186 Today, the only significant
supra, note 7, § 6929.
182 Supra, note 3, s. 34(6). Also see the 1989 amendments to the CEPA, supra, note
78, which require federal-provincial consultation before any regulations are put in place.
183 See Egan, supra, note 174, O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804, 25 D.L.R. (2d)
145, and Reference Re s. 92(4) of the Vehicles Ac, 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 608, 15 D.L.R.
(2d) 255.
184 See Finkelstein, vol. 1, supra, note 145 at 42-46, relying on Hodge v. R (1883), 9 A.C.
117 (P.C.).
185 See AG. Nova Scotia v. AG. Canada, [1951] S.C.R. 31, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 369.
186 The legitimacy of executive delegation is affirmed in the majority decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in CN. Transportation, supra, note 96. Administrative delegations
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legal restriction on the delegation power is the prohibition of
judicial delegation
8 7
The liberalization of the delegation powers leaves
governments considering the delegation of environmental authority
free to decide two issues: the scope of the decision and the type of
decision-maker. The legal powers most central to the administration
of a cradle-to-grave scheme in Canada are the federal power over
international and interprovincial trade and commerce, and the
provincial powers over intraprovincial trade and property and civil
rights.188 The trade powers complement each other, since any joint
board would require both. The provincial power over property and
civil rights would assist the administration of a general compensation
scheme for human injury or the clean up of disposal sites.
189
The second question to consider is the type of decision-
maker. Governments created administrative boards because they
thought these boards could distinguish between political and expert
decision-making. Where a decision was said to require mostly
scientific expertise, whether the expertise was in social science or
pure science, then it appeared best to delegate the matter to a
board. However, where a decision involved political interest
balancing, then it appeared best to leave the decision-maker
were affirmed by a majority of the Court in Egg Marketing Reference, supra, note 79.
187 McEnvoy v. A.G. New Bnmswick, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 704.
188 Other powers which might be involved are: the federal taxing power, s. 91(3), supra,
note 8; and, if possible, the federal power to create superior courts as provided in section 96
and in the cases of Texaco Canada Ltd v. Clean Environment Commission, [1977] 6 W.W.R.
70 (Man. Q.B.) and Concerned Citizens of B.C. v. Capital Regional District, [1980] 6 W.W.R.
193 (B.C. S.C.), aff'd [1981] 1 W.W.R. 359, 25 B.C.L.R. 273 (C.A.) regarding provincial
restrictions on the powers given to environmental boards; also see Massey-Ferguson IndutsL
Ltd v. Saskatchewan., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 413, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 513 where a compensation board
was judged part of a regulatory scheme not equivalent to a section 96 court. Some provisions
necessary to the scheme would appear to be sustainable by various powers possessed by either
level: for example, the regulation of disposal sites could be sustained by section 92(10)(c) or
92(16).
189 Compensation schemes were found within provincial jurisdiction in Interprovincial
Cooperatives, supra, note 60. Equally, they were ruled outside general federal jurisdiction in
the Employment and Social Insurance Reference, supra, note 60. There are some exceptions
to this prohibition at the federal level, but these are limited schemes tied to specific federal
powers, not general powers. Moreover, none of these schemes has the scale of a toxic waste
clean-up scheme.
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political. Experience has shown that where expert decision-makers
have been used for political decision-making, the phenomenon of
agency capture appears. Agency capture exists when a public
regulatory body ceases to regulate for the public interest, and
instead regulates for the benefit of the interests under regulation 90
Once a government has decided the scope of the decision
and the type of decision, it remains to decide the direction of the
delegation. It has three options: delegating federal authority to a
provincial authority; delegating provincial authority to a federal
authority; or mutually delegating authority to an independent
authority.
To date, the most extensive Canadian schemes involving
delegated authority are agricultural marketing schemes. The Egg
Marketing Board Reference decision outlines the constitutional basis
for such sophisticated delegation schemes 91  Egg marketing
involves the joint delegation of federal and provincial trade powers
to expert bodies within a two-tiered administrative scheme. The first
tier is a board regulating all intraprovincial egg production; the
second tier is a board regulating all interprovincial trade, setting
quotas for each province. Canadian governments have created these
boards because they judged agricultural marketing decisions to
depend more on expertise than politics. Marketing decisions require
long-term forecasting and consistent behaviour; political interest
balancing would disrupt this long-term stability. Equally, the
delegations have not unduly limited government action. The
delegations involve discrete powers of limited scope, whereas
agricultural marketing boards regulate only a limited number of
products.
Regardless of which option the federal government took for
the comprehensive regulation of toxic substances, it would have
Canadian precedents. However, given the scale of toxic chemicals
190 For a critical assessment of this theory in American administrations, see P. Sabatier,
"Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate - and Less
Pessimistic - Theory of 'Clientele Capture" (1975) 6 Policy Sciences 301. In Sabatier's
analysis, the key to avoiding capture is the existence of a public constituency that is supportive
of aggressive regulation (like the Consumers' Association of Canada for the CRTC).
191 Supra, note 79.
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contamination and the complexity of comprehensive control, the
two-tiered system of control employed for agricultural marketing is
preferable to single-tiered control by one government. The local
tier could control disposal standards including their supervision and
enforcement. It could also have the power to set economic
incentives for pollution control, provide compensation for the clean-
up of sites, and supervise waste reduction and management
programs. The federal tier could regulate interprovincial trade and
disposal and supervise the provincial programs.
Unfortunately, Canadian governments apparently have not
accepted that environmental regulation is an expert function more
than a political function. Virtually all environmental regulation has
remained under ministerial discretion, even where cooperative
schemes are in place.192 This approach does not meet current
regulatory needs: environmental regulation requires expert
examination and analysis, and a decision-maker with a long-term
focus and consistency. Moreover, the regulatory experience of
Canada and the United States does not support ministerial
supervision of the environment. The American experience with the
Environmental Protection Agency 93 is useful to Canada. Unlike
most American federal agencies, the EPA was placed under executive
supervision by American legislators to try and avoid agency capture.
However, the Reagan years of federal executive control over the EPA
suggest that greater not lesser distance from the federal executive
would be beneficial to environmental protection.194 Moreover,
observers of American commissions now doubt that agency capture
always occurs in the American experience. Canadian experience
suggests similar grounds of scepticism toward the theory of agency
capture. In Canada, important regulatory bodies like the CRTC, for
example, do not appear to be captured despite many years of
existence. By contrast, Canadian ministers traditionally have reduced
environmental control to private negotiations with industry. This
192 One notable exception is the delegation of environmental assessment in Ontario to
the Environmental Assessment Board: Environmental Assessnent Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 140.
193 Hereinafter EPA.
194 See JJ. Florio, "Congress As Reluctant Regulator. Hazardous Waste Policy in the
1980s" (1986) 3 Yale 3. of Legis. 351.
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alliance has often explicitly excluded the public.195 These reasons
suggest that the EPA model of executive control is not appropriate
for Environment Canada 9 6
Moreover, current problems with ministerial supervision are
not simply political, they are also bureaucratic. Experience suggests
that Canada may lack federal administrative bodies over the
environment because of bureaucratic self-interest. Bureaucracies
support ministerial control over agency control: ministerial control
maintains bureaucratic powers.1 97  This scepticism about
bureaucracies is not simply speculative. Bureaucratic interests have
already influenced many decisions about the scope of cEPA, 198 and
there is no reason to think their influence on CEPA will diminish.
IV. CONCLUSION
Progress in environmental law must be two sided: one
cannot have progress in environmental thinking without similar
progress in law. In Canada, we have clear progress in
environmental thinking when cradle-to-grave coverage replaces
point-source coverage. Cradle-to-grave coverage of the flow of
195 See Schrecker, supra, note 45 at 16-23.
196 A further reason why the American EPA is an inappropriate model for Environment
Canada is the contrast between Canadian and American federalism. The EPA possesses more
comprehensive powers over the American environment than Environment Canada has over the
Canadian environment. The EPA may rely on the almost unlimited power over interstate
commerce to implement environmental policies: see supra, notes 87-93. The EPA does not
run into jurisdictional difficulties.
197 Bureaucratic support for a divided state is revealed in a study of the federal
administration of trucking in Canada. See R.J. Schultz, Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Public
Policy: The Politics of Highway Transport Regulation (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1980). In 1967, the federal government tried to reform Canadian transportation law.
The reform called for all transport regulation to be administered by the Canadian Transport
Commission. However, the reform failed when both federal and provincial bureaucracies
made no efforts to assist a policy which took affairs out of their hands and put it in the hands
of an independent agency.
198 Bureaucratic problems explain why the CEPA has residual jurisdiction over toxic
chemicals instead of supervisory jurisdiction: see supra, note 37. More recently, further
bureaucratic infighting has slowed other federal environmental reforms: see "Federal
Environment Plan Bogs Down" The Globe and Mail (2 February 1990) Al and A9.
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chemicals through the human and natural environment means that
ecology and not just physics impacts on environmental regulation.
This advance in thinking should be greeted with open arms.
Unfortunately, the environmental influence on
environmental law can conflict with the legal influence on
environmental law. In Canada, constitutional law inhibits
environmental laws because the jurisdictional picture dividing federal
and provincial powers divides the environment into many different
spheres. This division accords nicely with the point source approach
to environmental problems, but it conflicts with the more
sophisticated ecosystem approach. This conflict has two resolutions.
At this point, the constitution has won over the environment. The
federal government has changed the original cradle-to-grave proposal
to lessen its effect on the provinces. This move directly affects one
piece of legislation, but it also affects most future environmental
action at the federal level.
Cradle-to-grave regulation is only the start of ecosystem
concern in law. Government still has to bring the ecosystem
together with sustainable economic development. Canadian
environmental regulation lacks economic incentives to reduce waste;
it lacks compensation schemes to clean up existing waste problems;
and it lacks complete public accountability to ensure that
governments and businesses strike sustainable bargains. These
initiatives need a national not a local dimension. If cradle-to-grave
control cannot be implemented, how can these more extensive
programs be implemented?
This paper describes two approaches to current
constitutional restrictions: one approach tackles the legal doctrines
of federalism. By this approach, environmentalists would seek to
alter the image of Canadian federalism, shifting it from a multi-
faceted jurisdictional federalism to a geographical federalism. With
geographical federalism, the provinces would deal with local
environmental problems and the federal government would deal with
national environmental problems.
The second approach, to mitigating the constitutional
restrictions hindering the federal government involves enhancing
administrative arrangements with the provinces. Here,
environmentalists would push the federal government to create a
federal-provincial scheme which would encompass ecosystem
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concerns. The federal government has several powers capable of
directing such an initiative. First, the federal government could use
the spending power to provide uniform administration and
enforcement of comprehensive environmental regulation across
Canada. Equally, it could use this power to link regional economic
development to environmental performance. Secondly, the federal
government could use its declaratory power to create a national
scheme of toxic disposal sites, thus removing a major regulatory
burden facing the provinces.199 Federal responsibility for this area
could encourage provinces to assist the federal government in
thoroughly controlling the remaining aspects of a comprehensive
cradle-to-grave scheme. Thirdly, the federal government could urge
the creation of an extensive federal-provincial scheme of expert
environmental boards. These boards could administer the various
industry-government agreements characterizing environmental law;
they could tackle the relationship between the costs for clean-up
and compliance and the revenues from taxes or charges; and they
could enhance environmental uniformity across the country by taking
many environmental issues out of the hands of politicians and
political bureaucracies. Administrative strategies like these would
put some pressure on provinces to respond positively.
Both levels of reform seem appropriate to the enactment of
comprehensive environmental reforms. Regional assessment may put
the reforms on a more rational constitutional footing; cooperation
is always necessary to regulate local and national environmental
problems in a consistent way.
Yet the murky medium of Canadian federalism will not clear
on its own. Law is not a self-moving force. Environmentalists have
moved the law to a greater comprehension of environmental issues.
To attain a sustainable state of affairs, however, environmentalists
will need to do more than simply change the system from the
outside. They must learn the constraints inside the system. These
constraints involve the legal doctrine of federalism. At present,
federalism is a dark hole in the grey matter of law. No one should
expect the greening of this darkness. But environmentalists can
enlighten this darkness by learning the history and the future
199 Relying on section 92(10)(c), supra, note 8: also see supra, notes 103 and 157.
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possibilities of Canadian federalism. These efforts would help
ensure that future negotiations on federalism consider the full range
of environmental concerns.

